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Abstract
Information-theoretical private information retrieval (PIR) is considered from a coded
database with colluding servers. The storage code is a locally repairable code (LRC) with
maximal recoverability (MR), and in particular, with optimal global minimum distance, for
arbitrary code parameters: Number of local groups g, locality r, local distance δ, dimension
k ≤ gr and length n = g(r + δ − 1). Servers are identified bijectively with local groups,
and only locally non-redundant information is considered and downloaded from each server,
that is, only r nodes (out of r + δ − 1) are considered per server. When the remaining
MDS code, after removing all locally redundant nodes, is a linearized Reed-Solomon code,
a PIR scheme is provided achieving the (download) rate R = (N − k − rt + 1)/N , where
N = gr = n− g(δ − 1) is the length of the restricted MDS code, for any t colluding servers
such that k + rt ≤ N . The field size is roughly gr, polynomial in the number of servers g.
Assume an arbitrarily large number of stored files. If N − k − rt = 0, the rate R = 1/N is
the highest known and coincides with that of previous PIR schemes that work for any MDS
storage code. If N − k − rt > 0, the achieved rate R > 1/N coincides with the best known
rate of PIR schemes for MDS storage codes (but which do not work for LRCs or linearized
Reed-Solomon storage codes) and is always strictly higher than that of known PIR schemes
that work for arbitrary MDS storage codes. Finally, the obtained PIR scheme can also be
adapted to the case where communication between the user and each server is through a
linearly-coded network, achieving the same rate as previous known PIR schemes but with
polynomial field sizes in the number of servers, instead of exponential.
Keywords: Distributed storage, information-theoretical privacy, linearized Reed-Solomon
codes, locally repairable codes, maximally recoverable codes, private information retrieval.
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR), introduced in [6, 7], consists in retrieving a file from a
database without revealing the index of the retrieved file to the servers. In this work, we consider
information-theoretical privacy. Originally [6, 7], databases were considered to store files using a
repetition code, that is, each server stores one copy of each file, and servers were not considered
to communicate with each other (collude) in order to gain information on the file index.
As it was pointed out in these seminal works, an obvious solution to the PIR problem is to
download the entire database. However, this turns out to be wasteful and much higher download
rates, or simply rates (the size of the file divided by the amount of downloaded data), can be
∗
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achieved when more than one server is used. It was also shown in these seminal works that
downloading the whole database is the only solution in the single-server case (for information-
theoretical privacy). PIR from a database where data is stored after encoded by a non-repetition
code (coded database) was considered in [2, 10, 29]. However, the number of servers in these
works is either larger than the number of files or grows as the overhead of the storage code
decreases, which are not practical scenarios.
Explicit PIR schemes from a database that uses an MDS storage code, and for τ ≥ 1 colluding
servers, were obtained in [11, 34, 35, 39]. The optimal rate for a fixed number m of stored files is
R =
N − k − τ + 1
N
·
(
1−
(
k + τ − 1
N
)m)−1
, (1)
for the cases τ = 1 [1, 30] and k = 1 [31], although (1) is not optimal in general [32]. If the
MDS storage code has dimension k and length N , universal PIR schemes (compatible with any
(N, k) MDS storage code) were obtained in [34, 35] with rate R = 1/N , for τ = N − k, and rate
R = (N − k)/N for τ = 1. For τ = 1 or k = 1, these rates become optimal exponentially fast as
the number of files increases, according to (1). For τ > 1 and k > 1, the optimal rate is unknown
in general, but the rate of the PIR scheme in [11], R = (N − k− τ + 1)/N , is the highest known
for an unrestricted number of files and is always strictly larger than that of known universal PIR
schemes [34]. Unfortunately, the scheme in [11] works for (generalized) Reed-Solomon storage
codes [27], but not for other MDS storage codes. Recently, it has been shown in [9] that the rate
in [11] can be improved for a finite number of files m to the rate in (1). However, the improved
rate (1) reduces again to (N − k − τ + 1)/N exponentially fast as the number of files increases.
As pointed out in the distributed storage literature however, MDS codes are not suitable for
large databases, since repairing a failed node requires contacting and downloading the content
of a large number of nodes, resulting in high repair latency. Locally repairable codes (LRCs),
introduced in [14, 17] and already applied in practice [15, 28], allow to repair a single erasure (or
generally δ − 1 erasures per local group, for a local distance δ) by contacting at most a number
r, called locality, of other nodes. At the same time, they may correct d − 1 global erasures in
catastrophic cases, where d is the minimum distance of the LRC. Maximally recoverable (MR)
LRCs were introduced in [3, 13] and allow to correct any information-theoretically correctable
erasure pattern for given parameters k, r, δ and number of local groups g. MR-LRCs have
optimal distance, but in general LRCs with optimal distance (such as those in [37]) are not MR.
Although some works in PIR consider general storage codes [11, 18], no work has achieved
rates comparable to [11] for optimal LRC or MR-LRC databases, to the best of our knowledge.
In this work, we provide a PIR scheme for the class of MR-LRC storage codes introduced in
[22], based on linearized Reed-Solomon codes [20]. With parameters as above, the total length
of the MR-LRC code is n = g(r + δ − 1) and the required field size is roughly gr, which is the
smallest known for MR-LRCs in the paremeter regime r ≤ gr − k (see [22]).
Since nodes inside a local group need to communicate much more frequently than with other
nodes, we identify bijectively servers with local groups. Since there are δ−1 redundant nodes per
local group, we only consider and download information from the r remaining nodes. In this way,
we may think of t colluding servers as τ = rt colluding nodes (although not any rt colluding nodes
correspond to some t colluding servers). The remaining storage code after removing the local
redundancies will be an MDS linearized Reed-Solomon code [20] of length N = gr = n− g(δ− 1)
and dimension k. Our PIR scheme achieves the rate R = (N − k − rt + 1)/N , coinciding with
the highest known for MDS storage codes for an unrestricted number of stored files [11].
On the mathematical side, to provide our PIR scheme, we introduce inner and coordinate-
wise matrix products, which simultaneously extend matrix products and classical coordinate-wise
products (also known as Schur products). We show in Corollary 11 that the coordinate-wise
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matrix product of two linearized Reed-Solomon codes is again a linearized Reed-Solomon code,
which recovers as particular cases the corresponding results on the matrix product of Gabidulin
codes [23, Lemma 10] (see also [36]) and the Schur product of Reed-Solomon codes [11, Prop.
3]. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the storage codes and PIR scheme in [11] are recovered
from ours simply by setting r = δ = 1 throughout this paper.
We remark that a PIR scheme from Gabidulin storage codes [12] has been recently given in
[36]. Gabidulin codes can be used to construct MR-LRCs similarly to linearized Reed-Solomon
codes (see [4, 26]), and the PIR scheme in [36] can be used for such MR-LRCs in the same way
as ours. However, the required field size would be at least 2gr (see Subsection 6.3), which is
exponential in the number of servers g and the code length N = gr, in contrast with polynomial
field sizes gr for our scheme (note also that r is preferably small). The main objective in [36]
is to give a PIR scheme where communication between the user and each server is through a
linearly coded network [19]. We will see in Subsection 6.3 that our PIR scheme can be used in
the same scenario, achieving the same rate, but with polynomial field sizes as noted above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we collect preliminaries on
linearized Reed-Solomon codes and MR-LRCs. In Section 3, we formulate general PIR schemes
for MR-LRC databases. In Section 4, we develop the mathematical tools regarding inner and
coordinate-wise matrix products for our PIR scheme. In Section 5, we give our particular PIR
scheme. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss some further considerations.
2 Preliminaries
Notation
Let q be a prime power. We will denote by F an arbitrary field, and by Fq the finite field with
q elements. Usually, we will consider F = Fqr , where r ≥ 1 will be the locality of the considered
storage codes.
We will also denote by Fm×n the set of m × n matrices with entries in F, and we denote
F
n = F1×n. For a positive integer n, we denote [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Given R ⊆ [n], we denote by
cR ∈ F
|R|, A|R ∈ F
m×|R| and CR ⊆ F
|R| the restrictions of a vector c ∈ Fn, a matrix A ∈ Fm×n
and a code C ⊆ Fn, respectively, to the coordinates indexed by R.
2.1 Linearized Reed-Solomon Codes
In this subsection, we recall the definition of linearized Reed-Solomon codes, which were intro-
duced in [20] and are natural hybrids between Reed-Solomon codes [27] and Gabidulin codes [12].
They are the main building blocks of the maximally recoverable and locally repairable storage
codes that we consider in this work (see the next subsection), which were introduced in [22].
Fix r ≥ 1 and let σ : Fqr −→ Fqr be the Fro¨benius field automorphism, given by σ(a) = a
q,
for all a ∈ Fqr . We next define linear operators as in [20, Def. 20].
Definition 1 ([20]). Fix a ∈ Fqr , and define its ith norm as Ni(a) = σ
i−1(a) · · ·σ(a)a, for i ∈ N.
We define the Fq-linear operator D
i
a : Fqr −→ Fqr by
Dia(β) = σ
i(β)Ni(a), (2)
for all β ∈ Fqr , and all i ∈ N. Define also Da = D
1
a and observe that D
i+1
a = Da ◦ D
i
a, for i ∈ N.
Denote by Fqr [Da] the polynomial ring in the operator Da, for a ∈ Fqr .
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Recall that the skew polynomial ring Fqr [x;σ], introduced in [25], is the polynomial ring on
the variable x but with non-commutative product given by the rule
xβ = σ(β)x, (3)
for all β ∈ Fqr . For F =
∑d
i=0 Fix
i ∈ Fqr [x;σ], we define
FDa =
d∑
i=0
FiD
i
a ∈ Fqr [Da], (4)
for a ∈ Fqr . In the following, for F =
∑d
i=0 Fix
i ∈ Fqr [x;σ], for a ∈ Fqr and for β =
(β1, β2, . . . , βr) ∈ F
r
qr , where βi ∈ Fqr , for i = 1, 2, . . . , r, we use the notation
FDa(β) = (FDa(β1), F
Da(β2), . . . , F
Da(βr)) ∈ F
r
qr . (5)
Next, given a = (a1, a2, . . . , ag) ∈ F
g
qr , we define the total evaluation vector of F at (a,β) as
FDa(β) = (FDa1 (β), FDa2 (β), . . . , FDag (β)) ∈ FNqr , (6)
where N = gr. The following definition is a particular case of [20, Def. 31]. See also [22, Def. 3].
Definition 2 (Linearized Reed-Solomon codes [20]). Fix a primitive element γ ∈ F∗qr and
let a = (γ0, γ1, . . . , γg−1) ∈ Fgqr . Fix an ordered basis β = (β1, β2, . . . , βr) ∈ F
r
qr of Fqr over Fq.
For k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N = gr, we define the (N, k) linearized Reed-Solomon (LRS) code as
CN,k(a,β) = {F
Da(β) ∈ FNqr | F ∈ Fqr [x;σ], deg(F ) < k or F = 0} ⊆ F
N
qr .
Here, the degree deg(F ) of a non-zero skew polynomial F =
∑
i∈N Fix
i ∈ Fqr [x;σ], where
Fi ∈ Fqr for i ∈ N, is defined as the maximum i ∈ N such that Fi 6= 0.
Linearized Reed-Solomon codes recover Reed-Solomon codes [27] by setting r = 1 and β1 = 1,
and they recover Gabidulin codes [12] by setting g = 1. See also [21, Table II].
2.2 Locally Repairable Codes with Maximal Recoverability
In this subsection, we briefly recall the definitions of locally repairable codes [14, 17] and maximal
recoverability [3, 13], and we revisit the construction based on linearized Reed-Solomon codes
from [22].
Consider F to be an arbitrary finite field. As in [3, 13], we will consider disjoint local groups.
Definition 3 (Locally repairable codes [14, 17]). We say that a code C ⊆ Fn is a locally
repairable code (LRC) with (r, δ) localities if there exists a partition [n] = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ . . . ∪ Γg,
where Γi ∩ Γj = ∅ if i 6= j, such that
1. |Γj | = r + δ − 1, and
2. dH(CΓj ) ≥ δ,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , g. The set Γj is called the jth local group, r is called the locality, and δ is called
the local distance.
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Note that n = (r + δ − 1)g, but necessarily it must hold that k = dim(C) ≤ gr. Usually, the
restricted code CΓj is a subcode of an (r + δ − 1, r) MDS local linear code that can repair any
δ − 1 erasures in Γj from the other r nodes in Γj . Maximally recoverable LRCs, introduced in
[3, Def. 2.1] and [13, Def. 6], can correct any h more erasures than the Cartesian product of the
MDS local codes (the case h = 0), where h = gr − k ≥ 0 is the number of global parities. These
are all information-theoretically correctable erasure patterns for given r, δ, k and g. Formally:
Definition 4 (Maximal recoverability [3, 13]). We say that an LRC C ⊆ Fn with (r, δ)
localities is maximally recoverable (MR) if, for any ∆j ⊆ Γj with |∆j | = r, for j = 1, 2, . . . , g,
the restricted code C∆ ⊆ F
N is MDS, where ∆ =
⋃g
j=1∆j and N = |∆| = gr. We say for short
that C is MR-LRC. We will usually call C∆ ⊆ F
N a remaining MDS code of C (there is one for
each choice of ∆j ’s).
In general, MR-LRCs can correct more erasure patterns than LRCs with optimal minimum
distance with respect to the bound in [17, Th. 2.1], such as Tamo-Barg codes [37].
In [22, Const. 1], a construction of MR-LRCs was given based on linearized Reed-Solomon
codes (Definition 2). This construction recovers Reed-Solomon codes with local replication when
r = 1, and it recovers Cartesian products of local codes when k = N = gr (that is, h = 0).
Construction 1 (LRS-based MR-LRC [22]). Fix the positive integers g, r and δ, and choose
any base field size q > g. Next choose a dimension k = 1, 2, . . . , N = gr, and:
1. Outer code: An (N, k) linearized Reed-Solomon code Cout = CN,k(a,β) ⊆ F
N
qr as in Defini-
tion 2.
2. Local codes : Any linear (r + δ − 1, r) MDS code Cloc ⊆ F
r+δ−1
q .
3. Global code: Let Cglob ⊆ F
n
qr , with n = (r + δ − 1)g = N + (δ − 1)g, be given by
Cglob = CoutDiagg(A) ⊆ F
n
qr ,
where A ∈ F
r×(r+δ−1)
q is any generator matrix of Cloc and Diagg(A) = Diag(A,A, . . . , A) ∈
F
N×n
q is the block-diagonal matrix with A repeated in the main block-diagonal g times:
Diag(A,A, . . . , A) =

A 0 . . . 0
0 A . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . A
 .
Note that we also need that q ≥ r+ δ− 1 in Construction 1, but we are assuming that q > g
and in general it is desirable that g ≫ r + δ − 1, hence we do not stress that q ≥ r + δ − 1.
The following result is [22, Th. 2] and states the MR and LRC properties of the global code
Cglob in Construction 1.
Theorem 1 ([22]). Let Cglob ⊆ F
n
qr be the global code from Construction 1, and let Γj ⊆ [n] be
the subset of coordinates ranging from (r+δ−1)(j−1)+1 to (r+δ−1)j, for j = 1, 2, . . . , g. Then
the code Cglob ⊆ F
n
qr has (r, δ) localities, local groups Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γg, and is maximally recoverable.
Observe that the field size required by Cglob in Construction 1 is |F| ≈ g
r. When r ≤ h =
gr − k, these codes are the MR-LRCs with smallest field sizes known so far. If r is small and
constant, global decoding with Cglob has comparable complexity to that of Tamo-Barg codes or
Reed-Solomon codes (see [22, Ex. 2] and [22, Subsec. VI-B]).
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3 Private Information Retrieval from MR-LRC Databases
In this section, we describe the private information retrieval (PIR) model that we consider in
this work. Since we focus on MR-LRC databases, we make the following two observations:
1. Since communication is much more frequent and necessary among nodes inside a local
group, we consider local groups Γj ⊆ [n], rather than individual nodes j ∈ [n], as corruptable
units. In other words, the jth server will be identified with the jth local group, storing
r + δ − 1 symbols from each codeword of the LRC, one symbol per node. Thus a subset
T ⊆ [g] of colluding servers is the same as the corresponding (r+ δ−1)|T | colluding nodes.
2. To help reduce the downloaded amount of data from the jth server (i.e. jth local group, see
Item 1), we assume that only r stored symbols from each codeword are downloaded from
that server, since the remaining δ − 1 nodes only contain locally redundant information.
In other words, we consider private information retrieval from the remaining MDS coded data
obtained by removing all local redundancies (Definition 4), where colluding servers are identified
with colluding local groups of nodes. Since the remaining MDS code in Construction 1 is a
linearized Reed-Solomon code (Definition 2), the main objective of the rest of the paper is to
obtain a tailor-made PIR scheme for linearized Reed-Solomon codes, where our strategy will
be to protect against any τ = rt colluding nodes. Note however that, after removing the local
redundancies, not all sets of rt colluding nodes correspond to some t colluding servers.
Fix positive integers b, m and k ≤ N = gr, and let x1, x2, . . . , xm ∈ Fb×kqr be the m files to
be stored. Arrange them as
X =
 x
1
...
xm
 ∈ Fbm×kqr .
Let Gout ∈ F
k×N
qr be a generator matrix of the k-dimensional outer code Cout ⊆ F
N
qr in Construc-
tion 1. Then
Gglob = GoutDiagg(A) ∈ F
k×n
qr (7)
is the generator matrix of the global code Cglob ⊆ F
n
qr in Construction 1, where A ∈ F
r×(r+δ−1)
q
is a generator matrix of an (r + δ − 1, r) MDS code. Recall that N = gr and n = g(r + δ − 1).
Each file xi is then encoded into yi = xiGglob ∈ F
b×n
qr , where y
i
Γj
∈ F
b×(r+δ−1)
qr is stored in
the jth server, and where Γj is as in Theorem 1. Let ∆j ⊆ Γj be the first r coordinates in Γj
and assume that the first r columns of A form the identity matrix (i.e. A is systematic). Then
if we disregard the nodes in Γj \∆j , the part of the ith file stored in the jth server is z
i
j ∈ F
b×r
qr ,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , g, where
Z = XGout =
 z
1
...
zm
 = (z1, z2, . . . , zg) =
 z
1
1 . . . z
1
g
...
. . .
...
zm1 . . . z
m
g
 ∈ Fbm×Nqr . (8)
Thus the remaining MDS code coincides with the outer code in Construction 1, C∆ = Cout,
which is a linearized Reed-Solomon code (Definition 2). We may now formalize a general private
information retrieval scheme for such a code.
Definition 5. A private information retrieval (PIR) scheme for the MR-LRC distributed storage
system described above consists, for each i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, of:
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1. Random queries
qij = (q
i,1
j ,q
i,2
j , . . . ,q
i,m
j ) ∈ F
bmr
qr ,
sent to the jth server to retrieve the ith file, where qi,ℓj ∈ F
br
qr , for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . ,m and
j = 1, 2, . . . , g.
2. The corresponding response rij = zj ·q
i
j ∈ F
r
qr of the jth server when requested the ith file
(note that the server only knows qij in principle), for j = 1, 2, . . . , g, where zj ∈ F
bmN
qr and
the product · will be given in (13). We denote ri = (ri1, r
i
2, . . . , r
i
g) ∈ F
N
qr .
3. A number s of iterations of Items 1 and 2, until the ith file can be recovered from the
responses ri in Item 2.
4. A reconstruction function with input the s responses ri and output the ith file xi.
Note that one major difference with [11, Def. 4] and the one-shot schemes in [9] is that we
do not use the usual inner product z · q, but a generalization of it (see Definition 8).
As usual in the PIR literature, our goal is to maximize the download rate, which is defined
as the file size divided by the amount of downloaded data. The upload cost may be considered
negligible by further folding the scheme b′ ≫ 1 times, thus a total of bb′ times. In our case, we
disregard local redundancies, hence the download rate is as follows.
Definition 6. We define the download rate, or simply rate, of a PIR scheme given as in Definition
5 as
R =
bk
Ns
. (9)
We require information-theoretical privacy for a given number t of colluding servers (i.e.
colluding local groups).
Definition 7. We say that a PIR scheme as in Definition 5 protects against t colluding servers
if, for every T ⊆ [g] of size t, in each iteration of the scheme we have that
I((qij)j∈T ; i) = 0,
where I(X ;Y ) denotes the mutual information between two random variables X and Y (see [8,
Ch. 12]).
4 Coordinate-wise and Inner Matrix products
In this section, we define and collect the main properties of inner and coordinate-wise matrix
products, which will be used in our PIR scheme, as shown in Item 2 in Definition 5.
4.1 Definition and Linearity Properties
Fix an ordered basis β = (β1, β2, . . . , βr) ∈ F
r
qr of Fqr over Fq. Denote by Mβ : F
r
qr −→ F
r×r
q
the corresponding matrix-representation map, given by
Mβ (x) =

x11 x
1
2 . . . x
1
r
x21 x
2
2 . . . x
2
r
...
...
. . .
...
xr1 x
r
2 . . . x
r
r
 , (10)
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for x = (x1, x2, . . . , xr) ∈ F
r
qr , where x
1
j , x
2
j , . . . , x
r
j ∈ Fq are the unique scalars such that xj =∑m
i=1 βix
i
j ∈ Fqr , for j = 1, 2, . . . , r. Observe that Mβ is an Fq-linear vector space isomorphism,
and it is the identity map if r = 1 and β1 = 1.
Definition 8. Given x,y ∈ Frqr , we define their matrix product with respect to the basis β as
x ⋆ y =M−1β (Mβ(x)Mβ(y)) ∈ F
r
qr . (11)
For N = gr, x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xg) ∈ F
N
qr and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yg) ∈ F
N
qr , where xj ,yj ∈ F
r
qr , for
j = 1, 2, . . . , g, we define their coordinate-wise matrix product as
x ∗ y = (x1 ⋆ y1,x2 ⋆ y2, . . . ,xg ⋆ yg) ∈ F
N
qr , (12)
and we define their inner matrix product · as
x · y =
g∑
j=1
xj ⋆ yj ∈ F
r
qr . (13)
The products ⋆, ∗ and · all depend on the subfield Fq ⊆ Fqr (thus q and r) and the ordered
basis β, but we will not denote this dependence for simplicity. The classical coordinate-wise and
inner products in FNq , used in [11] for PIR (and in general in the literature, see [9]), are recovered
by setting r = 1 and β1 = 1 (thus N = g).
From the definitions, we note also that, if x = (x1, x2, . . . , xr) ∈ F
r
qr and y =
∑r
i=1 βiy
i ∈
F
r
qr , with xi ∈ Fqr and y
i ∈ Frq, for i = 1, 2, . . . , r, then
M−1β (Mβ(x)Mβ(y)) =
r∑
i=1
xiy
i ∈ Frqr . (14)
From Equation (14) applied coordinate-wise, we deduce the following bilinearity properties.
Lemma 9. The coordinate-wise matrix product ∗ is Fq-bilinear and Fqr -linear in the first com-
ponent, that is,
1. (x+ x′) ∗ y = x ∗ y + x′ ∗ y and x ∗ (y + y′) = x ∗ y + x ∗ y′,
2. (ax) ∗ y = a(x ∗ y) and x ∗ (by) = b(x ∗ y),
for all x,x′,y,y′ ∈ FNqr , all a ∈ Fqr and all b ∈ Fq.
4.2 Products of Skew and Linearized Polynomials
We have the following important connection between the rings Fqr [x;σ] and Fqr [Da], for all
a ∈ Fqr . We consider Fqr [Da] as a ring with conventional addition and with composition of maps
as multiplication, denoted by ◦.
Lemma 10. For all F,G ∈ Fqr [x;σ] and all a ∈ Fqr , it holds that
(FG)Da = FDa ◦GDa .
In particular, the map Fqr [x;σ] −→ Fqr [Da] given by (4) is a (surjective) ring morphism.
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Proof. Observe that
Da ◦ (βId) = σ(β)Da, (15)
for all β ∈ Fqr , where Id = D
0
a is the multiplicative identity of Fqr [Da], and note that (15)
coincides with (3) if we set x = Da. Since (3) is the defining property of the product in the skew
polynomial ring Fqr [x;σ], the result follows.
The main result of this section is showing that products of skew polynomials become coordinate-
wise matrix products after evaluation via the operators Da.
Theorem 2. Let β = (β1, β2, . . . , βr) ∈ F
r
qr be an ordered basis of Fqr over Fq, and let coordinate-
wise matrix products ∗ be defined via β. Then it holds that
(FG)Da(β) = FDa(β) ∗GDa(β),
for all vectors a = (a1, a2, . . . , ag) ∈ F
g
qr and all skew polynomials F,G ∈ Fqr [x;σ].
Proof. In [23, Prop. 1], it was proven that
σℓ(β) ⋆ y = σℓ(y), (16)
for all ℓ ∈ N and all y ∈ Frqr . We recall the proof of (16) for convenience of the reader. If
y =
∑r
i=1 βiy
i, where yi ∈ Frq, for i = 1, 2, . . . , r, then
σℓ(β) ⋆ y =
r∑
i=1
σℓ(βi)y
i = σℓ
(
r∑
i=1
βiy
i
)
= σℓ(y),
where the first equality is (14).
Since ⋆ is Fqr -linear in the first component (Lemma 9), and D
ℓ
a = Nℓ(a)σ
ℓ, whereNℓ(a) ∈ Fqr ,
then we deduce from (16) that
Dℓa(β) ⋆ y = (Nℓ(a)σ
ℓ(β)) ⋆ y = Nℓ(a)(σ
ℓ(β) ⋆ y) = Nℓ(a)σ
ℓ(y) = Dℓa(y),
for all a ∈ Fqr , all y ∈ F
r
qr and all ℓ ∈ N. The case g = 1 thus follows by combining the linearity
on the first component of the matrix product (Lemma 9) with Lemma 10 for g = 1.
Finally, the theorem for general g follows by applying the case g = 1 separately in each of
the g coordinates over the alphabet Frqr , and applying Lemma 10.
Setting r = 1 and β1 = 1, the previous theorem is nothing but the well-known fact that
coordinate-wise evaluation transforms conventional polynomial products into the conventional
coordinate-wise product.
We conclude by deducing that the product of two linearized Reed-Solomon codes over the
same ordered basis β is again a linearized Reed-Solomon code. For this purpose, given Fqr -linear
codes C1, C2 ⊆ F
N
qr , we define their coordinate-wise matrix product as
C1 ∗ C2 = 〈{c1 ∗ c2 | c1 ∈ C1, c2 ∈ C2}〉 ⊆ F
N
qr ,
where 〈A〉 may denote either the Fq-linear or the Fqr -linear vector space generated by A ⊆ F
N
qr .
Corollary 11. Let β = (β1, β2, . . . , βr) ∈ F
r
qr be an ordered basis of Fqr over Fq, and let
coordinate-wise matrix products ∗ be defined via β. For a primitive element γ ∈ F∗qr , for a =
(γ0, γ1, . . . , γg−1) ∈ Fgqr , and for any k1, k2 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N , with k1 ≥ 1, we have that
CN,k1(a,β) ∗ CN,k2(a,β) = CN,k1+k2−1(a,β),
if k1 + k2 − 1 ≤ N , and CN,k1(a,β) ∗ CN,k2(a,β) = F
N
qr otherwise.
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Proof. It follows by combining Lemma 9, Theorem 2 and the fact that
deg(FG) = deg(F ) + deg(G),
for all skew polynomials F,G ∈ Fqr [x;σ].
Setting r = 1 and β1 = 1, Corollary 11 recovers the well-known fact that the classical
coordinate-wise product of two Reed-Solomon codes is again a Reed-Solomon code. See for
instance [11, Prop. 3]. Setting g = 1, Corollary 11 recovers the fact that the matrix product of
two Gabidulin codes is again a Gabidulin codes. See for instance [23, Lemma 10] or [36].
5 Concrete PIR Schemes for LRS-based MR-LRC databases
In this section, we provide a concrete PIR scheme for the remaining MDS code of the MR-LRC
storage code considered in Section 3, which is a linearized Reed-Solomon code (Definition 2). To
that end, we will show how to construct the queries and how to reconstruct the file from the
responses. The set of server responses, given the queries, are as described in Definition 5.
Let the notation be as in Section 3, fix an ordered basis β = (β1, β2, . . . , βr) ∈ F
r
qr of Fqr over
Fq, and let coordinate-wise matrix products ∗ be defined via β. We set throughout this section
t ≥ 1 as the target number of colluding servers, with the restriction
k + rt ≤ N, (17)
and we will set c = N − k − rt + 1 > 0.
For clarity, we present two schemes, being the first one (Subsection 5.1) a particular case of
the second one (Subsection 5.2) by setting b = 1. Both schemes will achieve the PIR rate
R =
c
N
=
N − k − rt+ 1
N
, (18)
coinciding with the rate of the PIR scheme in [11] for (N, k) Reed-Solomon storage codes. See
Section 1 for a discussion on the optimality of such rates. We also remark here that the scheme
in [11] is recovered from our second scheme by setting r = δ = 1.
5.1 First Scheme: No Folding
Our first scheme assumes no minimum folding of the files, that is, b = 1, and is precisely
the particular case of our second scheme obtained by setting b = 1. Note that the stored
codewords may however be further folded b′ ≫ 1 times without folding the PIR scheme. The
main disadvantage of choosing b = 1 is that the dimension k must be divisible by c = N−k−rt+1.
Relaxing this divisibility assumption is the advantage of the second scheme.
As stated above, assume that k = sc, for some s ∈ N, which will be the number of iterations
of the scheme. This can be trivially assumed if k + rt = N , thus c = 1 and s = k. Note that
this is the best choice for the competing parameters k and t satisfying (17), but it gives the
smallest PIR rate R = 1/N ≤ c/N among our schemes, although R = 1/N is still far better than
downloading the whole database (which gives rate 1/m), since m≫ N in practice.
Fix file and iteration indices i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and u = 1, 2, . . . , s, respectively. We now
describe the two steps of uth iteration in Definition 5 to privately retrieve the ith file.
Step 1, Queries: Choose m codewords dℓ = (dℓ1,d
ℓ
2, . . . , d
ℓ
g) ∈ F
N
qr uniformly at random
from CN,rt(a,β), where d
ℓ
j ∈ F
r
qr , for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , g. The random vectors
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dℓ = dℓ(u) depend on the iteration index u (i.e. dℓ(1),dℓ(2), . . . ,dℓ(s) are identically distributed
but independent),s corres but we sometimes omit the index u for simplicity. Set
dj = (d
1
j ,d
2
j , . . . ,d
m
j ) ∈ F
rm
qr ,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , g. Define the set
Ju = c(u− 1) + [c].
Finally, for each server j = 1, 2, . . . , g, we define its query by
qij(u) = dj(u) + e
i
j(u) ∈ F
rm
qr , (19)
where we define eij(u) ∈ F
rm
qr as being zero everywhere except in the ith block of r coordinates
over Fqr , where it is defined as
M−1β (I((j−1)r+[r])∩Ju) ∈ F
r
qr . (20)
Here, we define IJ ∈ F
r×r
q , for a set J ⊆ (j−1)r+[r], as the diagonal matrix IJ = Diag(δ
J
1 , δ
J
2 , . . . , δ
J
r ),
where δJκ = 1 if (j − 1)r+ κ ∈ J , and δ
J
κ = 0 otherwise. Note that I∅ ∈ F
r×r
q is the zero matrix.
Step 2, Responses: Due to the definition of the queries in (19) and the inner matrix product
(13), the reader can check that the total response in the uth iteration is
ri(u) =
m∑
ℓ=1
(zℓ ∗ dℓ(u)) + (0(u−1)c, z
i
Ju
,0N−uc) ∈ F
N
qr ,
where 0M ∈ F
M
qr is a zero vector of length M .
File reconstruction: We now describe how to recover the ith file by combining the responses
from all s iterations. Let H ∈ Fc×Nqr be a parity-check matrix of
CN,k+rt−1(a,β) = CN,k(a,β) ∗ CN,rt(a,β)
(recall Corollary 11). For u = 1, 2, . . . , s, we compute
ri(u)HT = (0(u−1)c, z
i
Ju
,0N−uc)H
T ,
which holds since
m∑
ℓ=1
(zℓ ∗ dℓ(u)) ∈ CN,k+rt−1(a,β).
Since CN,k+rt−1(a,β) is MDS by Theorem 1, its dual is also MDS, and we can recover the vector
ziJu ∈ F
c
qr from r
i(u)HT . Since we have that
[k] = J1 ∪ J2 ∪ . . . ∪ Js,
collecting all such s restrictions ziJu , we obtain
(zi1, z
i
2, . . . , z
i
k) = x
i(Gout)[k] ∈ F
k
qr .
Now, since CN,k(a,β) is MDS, again by Theorem 1, we may recover the ith file, x
i ∈ Fkqr , and
we are done.
Note that the MDS property in this last step is not necessary: If we take the generator matrix
Gout of the outer code CN,k(a,β) to be systematic, with the identity in the first k columns, then
it simply holds that xi = (zi1, z
i
2, . . . , z
i
k).
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Proof of privacy: We now show that the proposed PIR scheme protects against any t
colluding servers as in Definition 7. Recall from Section 3 that we identify servers with local
groups. Let T ⊆ [g], such that |T | = t, be the set of colluding local groups. Therefore, this can
be understood as an adversary gaining as information the values qij(u) ∈ F
rm
qr , for j ∈ T , and
for all iterations u = 1, 2, . . . , s. We will just write qij = q
i
j(u) for simplicity. We need to prove
that, for a given iteration, it holds that
I((qij)j∈T ; i) = 0.
Since CN,rt(a,β) ⊆ F
N
qr has dimension rt and is MDS by Theorem 1, it holds that any set of rt
coordinates in [N ] constitute an information set for CN,rt(a,β). In other words, the restricted
code CN,rt(a,β)T˜ = F
rt
qr is the whole space, where T˜ =
⋃
j∈T ((j − 1)r + [r]) ⊆ [N ] is the actual
set of colluding nodes. This implies that the vectors
(dℓj)j∈T ∈ F
rt
qr
are uniform random variables in Frtqr . Since the Cartesian product of uniform random variables
is again a uniform random variable, we deduce that
(dj)j∈T ∈ F
rtm
qr
is a uniform random variable in Frtmqr . Since the vector of queries (q
i
j)j∈T is a translation of the
random variable (dj)j∈T by a deterministic vector, we deduce that (q
i
j)j∈T is a uniform random
variable in Frtmqr . Since there is only one uniform random variable in F
rtm
qr , independently of i,
we deduce that I((qij)j∈T ; i) = 0, and we are done.
5.2 Second Scheme: Folding
In our second scheme, we avoid the constraint that k must be divisible by c = N −k− rt+1. To
that end, we will make use of the folding parameter b as done in [11]. Again, the stored codewords
may be further folded b′ ≫ 1 times without further folding the PIR scheme. We emphasize here
that the scheme in [11] is actually recovered from this second scheme by setting r = δ = 1, which
is the case in which linearized Reed-Solomon codes recover Reed-Solomon codes (see Subsection
2.1). Our first scheme is also recovered from this second scheme by setting b = 1. To avoid the
divisibility assumption, we define
b =
lcm(c, k)
k
and s =
lcm(c, k)
c
,
hence guaranteeing that bk = sc. Thus we may define
h =
k
s
=
c
b
.
Fix file and iteration indices i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and u = 1, 2, . . . , s, respectively. We now describe
the two steps of uth iteration in Definition 5 to privately retrieve the ith file.
Step 1, Queries: Choose mb codewords dℓ,v = (dℓ,v1 , d
ℓ,v
2 , . . . , d
ℓ,v
g ) ∈ F
N
qr , uniformly at
random from CN,rt(a,β), where d
ℓ,v
j ∈ F
r
qr , for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . ,m, v = 1, 2, . . . , b, and j = 1, 2, . . . , g.
As before, dℓ,v = dℓ,v(u) depends on u, but we sometimes drop this in the notation. We set
dℓj = (d
ℓ,1
j ,d
ℓ,2
j , . . . ,d
ℓ,b
j ) ∈ F
rb
qr and
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dj = (d
1
j ,d
2
j , . . . ,d
m
j ) ∈ F
rbm
qr ,
for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , g. Define the sets
J1u = h(u− 1) + [h], J
2
u = h+ J
1
u, . . . , J
b
u = h(b− 1) + J
1
u.
Finally, for each server j = 1, 2, . . . , g, we define its query by
qij(u) = dj(u) + e
i
j(u) ∈ F
rbm
qr . (21)
In this case, we define eij(u) ∈ F
rbm
qr as being zero everywhere except in the (b(i− 1)+ v)th block
of r coordinates over Fqr , for v = 1, 2, . . . , b, where it is defined as
M−1β (I((j−1)r+[r])∩Jvu ) ∈ F
r
qr . (22)
As before, we define IJ ∈ F
r×r
q , for a set J ⊆ (j − 1)r + [r], as the diagonal matrix IJ =
Diag(δJ1 , δ
J
2 , . . . , δ
J
r ), where δ
J
κ = 1 if (j − 1)r + κ ∈ J , and δ
J
κ = 0 otherwise. As before,
I∅ ∈ F
r×r
q is the zero matrix.
Step 2, Responses: The reader can check that, from the definition of the queries in (21)
and the inner matrix product (13), the total response in the first iteration is
ri =
m∑
ℓ=1
b∑
v=1
(zℓ,v ∗ dℓ,v) + (zi,1
J1
1
, zi,2
J2
1
, . . . , zi,b
Jb
1
,0) ∈ FNqr , (23)
where 0 has length N − c. In the uth iteration, the response is obtained similarly, replacing zi,vJv
1
by zi,vJvu , but placed in the coordinates indexed by J
v
u taking the cyclicity of the coordinates in
[N ] into account, for v = 1, 2, . . . , b.
File reconstruction: We now describe how to recover the ith file by combining the responses
from all s iterations. As before, let H ∈ Fc×Nqr be a parity-check matrix of
CN,k+rt−1(a,β) = CN,k(a,β) ∗ CN,rt(a,β)
(recall Corollary 11). In the first iteration, we compute
riHT = (zi,1
J1
1
, zi,2
J2
1
, . . . , zi,b
Jb
1
,0)HT ,
which holds since
m∑
ℓ=1
b∑
v=1
(zℓ,v ∗ dℓ,v) ∈ CN,k+rt−1(a,β).
As before, CN,k+rt−1(a,β) is MDS by Theorem 1, and thus its dual is also MDS. Therefore we
may recover zi,1
J1
1
, zi,2
J2
1
, . . . , zi,b
Jb
1
∈ Fhqr from r
iHT .
In a similar way, in the uth iteration, we recover zi,1
J1u
, zi,2
J2u
, . . . , zi,b
Jbu
∈ Fhqr , for u = 1, 2, . . . , s.
For a given v = 1, 2, . . . , b, the reader can check from their definition that the sets Jv1 , J
v
2 , . . . , J
v
s
are disjoint and the size of their union is sh = k. Therefore, we recover k symbols of zi,v ∈ FNqr
over the alphabet Fqr , together with their indices, given by J
v
1 ∪ J
v
2 ∪ . . . ∪ J
v
s ⊆ [N ]. Since
CN,k(a,β) is MDS, we recover the vth row of the ith file, that is, x
i,v ∈ Fkqr , for v = 1, 2, . . . , b.
Thus we are done by collecting all b rows, xi,1,xi,2, . . . ,xi,b, of the ith file.
Proof of privacy: Analogous to that in Subsection 5.1.
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6 Further Considerations
6.1 Unequal Localities and Local Distances
The results in this work may be extended, in a straightforward way, to the case where each
local group Γj has a different locality rj and local distance δj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , g. See the
next subsection for a further extension. The MR-LRC in Construction 1 based on linearized
Reed-Solomon codes can be extended to arbitrary equal or unequal localities and local distances
as long as the field is Fqr , where q > g and r ≥ max{r1, r2, . . . , rg}. See [22, Sec. III]. By
choosing systematic generator matrices of the MDS local linear codes (which now are different),
the remaining MDS storage code after removing all local redundancies is again a k-dimensional
linearized Reed-Solomon code, although of length N =
∑g
j=1 rj .
For τ ≥ 1 colluding nodes, the achieved rate would still be R = (N − k− τ +1)/N . However,
t ≥ 1 colluding local groups correspond in this case to a number of colluding nodes that is
different for different sets of local groups. In other words, the collusion pattern [33] is generated
by maximal collusion sets of different sizes. We may still proceed with the strategy in this work,
that is, we may consider protecting against any τ = max{
∑
j∈T rj | T ⊆ [g], |T | = t} colluding
nodes. Improvements on the rate R = (N − k − τ + 1)/N may be possible for certain cases (as
in [33, Sec. V]), which we leave open.
Finally, the main motivation behind unequal localities and local distances is that some local
groups may require faster and/or more robust repair, for instance due to hot data, while global
erasure correction may be improved by considering the different localities and local distances.
See [5, 16, 38] for more details.
6.2 Arbitrary Local Linear Codes and Hierarchical Localities
As before, the results in this work may be extended, in a straightforward way, to the case where
each local group Γj uses an arbitrary rj-dimensional local linear code C
j
loc ⊆ F
nj
q , where Γj = |nj|
and rj + δj − 1 ≤ nj , where δj = d(C
j
loc), for j = 1, 2, . . . , g. Construction 1 still gives an MR-
LRC for any choice of local linear codes, see [22, Sec. IV]. Furthermore, the local codes may
be dynamically, efficiently and locally updated in order to adapt to different distributed storage
configurations, as discussed in [22, Subsec. V-A]. In particular, the local codes may be in turn
MR-LRCs, giving rise to multi-layer or hierarchical MR-LRCs (see [22, Def. 7], [22, Subsec. V-B]
and [24, Sec. II]), which have optimal global distance by [22, Th. 4]. As before, by choosing
systematic generator matrices of the local codes, the remaining MDS storage code after removing
the local redundancies is a linearized Reed-Solomon code of length N =
∑g
j=1 rj .
6.3 PIR over Linearly Coded Networks
Linear network coding [19] permits maximum information flow over a network from a source to
several sinks simultaneously in one shot (multicast). In [36], PIR is considered where each server
is formed by a number r ≥ 1 of nodes in the database and communication between the user and
each server is through a linearly coded network.
To avoid mixing information through the network for non-colluding sets of servers, it is
assumed in [36] that the linearly coded networks between the user and the servers are pair-wise
disjoint (after removing the user node). This makes the total transfer matrix from the user to
the database and back have a block-diagonal shape Diag(A1, A2, . . . , Ag) ∈ F
gr
q , where Aj ∈ F
r
qr
is the transfer matrix from the jth server to the user (we assume square transfer matrices for
simplicity). In other words, the total linearly coded network from the user to the servers and
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back can be considered as a multishot linearly coded network as in [21], with one shot per server.
The effect of such a channel is simply multiplying codewords by Diag(A1, A2, . . . , Ag).
It was shown in [21, Subsec. V-F] that multiplying on the right a linearized Reed-Solomon
code, as in Definition 2, by a block-diagonal matrix Diag(A1, A2, . . . , Ag) ∈ F
gr
q gives again
a linearized Reed-Solomon code, possibly with erasures if the matrices Aj are not full-rank.
Using this fact, our PIR scheme (Subsection 5.2) may be used mutatis mutandis in the scenario
described in this subsection and in [36]. In the error-free and erasure-free case, the rate obtained
in both works is
R =
N − k − rt+ 1
N
.
However, since Gabidulin codes [12] are used in [36], the required field size is qgr0 , where q0 ≥ 2 is
the field size of the underlying linear network code. Note that qgr0 is exponential in the number
of servers g, whereas our scheme would still require the field size gr, which is polynomial in the
number of servers g.
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